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Abstract
Why did evolution not give us a utility function that is o¤spring alone? Why do we
care intrinsically about other outcomes, such as food, and what determines the intensity
of such preferences? A common view is that such other outcomes enhance …tness and
the intensity of our preference for a given outcome is proportional to its contribution
to …tness. We argue that this view is incomplete. Speci…cally, we show that in the
presence of informational asymmetries, the evolutionarily most desirable preference for
a given outcome is determined not only by the signi…cance of the outcome, but by the
Agent’s degree of ignorance regarding its signi…cance. Our model also sheds light on
the phenomena of peer e¤ects and prepared learning, whereby some peer attitudes are
more in‡uential than others.
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Introduction

Despite a steady trickle of research on the issue over the last 20 years, it remains unconventional to consider the biological basis of utility or preferences.1 This approach holds out the
promise of generating a utility function with the key economic properties of being exogenous
and invariant. At …rst blush, such a biologically derived utility would value commodities
in accordance with their impact on …tness— we should value food, for example, in terms of
its marginal contribution to biological success. However, on re‡ection, a serious conceptual
problem arises— why have we been made to care about anything other than o¤spring?2 Why,
that is, if we are rational and intelligent, are we not programmed to like only o¤spring and
then to treat food, for example, as purely instrumental, as a means to an end? There seems
little doubt that there are many biologically intermediate goods that are nevertheless valued
intrinsically. In modern times, indeed, we readily sacri…ce expected o¤spring to increase consumption of other commodities. The recent “demographic transition,”during which incomes
rose but fertility fell is dramatic prima facie evidence on this score.
We consider a solution to this conundrum in terms of information. On the one hand,
there are relevant aspects of the environment that are “recurrent signals” in the sense of
having a long evolutionary history. For example, sunlight has long had an e¤ect in aiding
Vitamin D production and thereby enhancing health and …tness.3 Nature then has had the
opportunity to incorporate a liking for the sun in the utility function. On the other hand,
there are relevant aspects of the environment that are “transient signals” in the sense of
being local in time and space, and having arisen only rarely before, or perhaps never. These
signals might concern likely locations in which to sunbathe, for example. Natural selection
could not have been brought to bear directly on these aspects of the environment.
We assume that utility is shaped by Nature in the light of the recurrent signals only. The
individual maximizes the expectation of his utility, conditioning on both the recurrent and
transient signals, but using arbitrary beliefs. We derive two general results. First, despite
Nature’s inability to anticipate the transient signal, and despite the Individual’s holding
arbitrary beliefs, the equilibrium action chosen by the Individual is the best possible in
the sense of maximizing expected …tness conditional on both signals. Second, the resulting
marginal utility of an action is determined not by the marginal contribution of that action
1

Robson (2001) argues that a utility function serves as a method for Nature to partially decentralize
control, thus achieving a ‡exible response to novelty.
2
The number of o¤spring is assumed to be appropriately adjusted for quality throughout the paper.
3
The full importance of Vitamin D was only recently recognized.
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to …tness, but by the Individual’s degree of ignorance regarding such contribution.
Our theoretical approach is an instance of the principal-agent problem. In this interpretation, the principal (Nature), maximizes the productivity of the agent (Individual) by
choosing the agent’s utility function. While the principal-agent perspective is illuminating,
there are no formal techniques or results that can be directly imported from the existing
literature.4 In fact, the speci…c principal-agent problem we consider is not meaningful in
conventional economic applications. Most signi…cantly, we assume that (i) the principal has
the power to fully shape the agent’s preferences, (ii) all actions of the agent are contractible,
and (iii) the principal has information that cannot be directly communicated to the agent,
despite the parties having parallel interests in the information.
A paper that can be described in analogous terms is Samuelson & Swinkels (2006), who
also consider an environment in which both Nature and the Individual possess relevant
information. In an ideal case, the Individual would maximize expected …tness. In their
work, unlike ours, there is an emphasis on second-best solutions that provide a rationale for
behavioral biases.
Our focus throughout is on “primary”rather than “secondary”arguments of utility. That
is, we consider arguments that are desired as ends in themselves rather than as means to
an end. There are many primary arguments, of course. For example, Linden’s list includes
food, prestige, temperature, a view, and sex (see Linden, 2011). Bentham lists 26 categories
of “simple” pleasures and pains (Bentham, 1789). Perhaps the most salient example of a
secondary argument is money, which is fundamentally only a means to an end from the
perspective of the individual.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 outlines the basic model and considers a di¤erent direct mechanism by which
evolution could implement the optimal choice. We dismiss as unrealistic the possibility that
the Individual’s beliefs match the true distribution. This leaves us with a mechanism in
which Nature shapes utility in the light of her recurrent information and the individual
maximizes expected utility conditional on arbitrary beliefs.
4

In spirit, ours is a model of delegation. See, for example, Holmstrom (1984), Aghion & Tirole (1997),
Dessein (2002), Alonso & Matouschek (2008), and Armstrong & Vickers (2010).
5
Not all of Bentham’s categories seem clearly primary. For example, he nominates wealth as a simple
pleasure, but then defends this choice in terms of what the money can buy.
Since since money is a very familiar means, it induces a rather automatic response. It was once thought
that the fMRI signature of money could not be distinguished from that of sex. However, Sescousse et al.
(2010) show that money and sex have subtly distinct fMRI signatures, re‡ecting the instrumental role of
money.
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Section 3 considers the problem of existence of a utility function that guarantees …rst-best
actions. Although existence is delicate in a continuous formulation, it is a straightforward
question in a discrete approximation.
Section 4 relies on a continuous formulation while placing a monotone structure on the
problem. We show that optimal choice can be generated by a utility function that has a
simple additive form.
Section 5 considers various simple examples with quadratic …tness functions and normal
distributions for the signals. These examples illustrate that the marginal utility of a given
action depends on the precision of the recurrent signals relative to the precision of the
transient ones. In a labor-leisure example, the perceived cost of e¤ort may vary with the
task, although its actual …tness cost does not.
Section 6 shows how the present framework can be readily adapted to consider the evolution of interdependent preferences. We derive a “desire for conformity.”In a simple example,
we show how greater precision for the recurrent signal relative to the transient signal may
lead to a greater weight being placed on another individual’s choice. This is of interest in
light of the psychological literature on “prepared learning.”
Section 7 discusses a type of preference misalignment that is likely to arise in modern
times owing to modern humans being more knowledgeable, relative to our hunter-gather
ancestors, of the link between actions and …tness. We argue that when our ancestors underestimated (overestimated) the marginal …tness value of a given action, modern humans will
select an excessively large (small) action relative to its …tness-maximizing level. Section 8
concludes.
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Model

There are two players: a principal (Nature) and an agent (the Individual). The agent faces
a one-shot opportunity to produce …tness y 2 R (representing quality-adjusted o¤spring).
Fitness is a function of the Individual’s action x 2 RN and an underlying state

2 R:

y = '(x; ):
The players have only partial knowledge of the state. That knowledge has two components: s 2 R and t 2 R. These components represent, respectively, recurrent and transient

aspects of the environment. The essential distinction is that the utility function given to the
4

Individual can depend on the recurrent component, s; but not on the transient component,
t: From Nature’s point of view, the (“true”) distribution of

conditional on (s; t) is given

by the pdf f ( j s; t); from the Individual’s point of view, the (“subjective”) distribution of
conditional on t is given by the pdf g( j s; t):

A more detailed interpretation of s and t is as follows. On the one hand, s represents

observed aspects of the environment whose implications have remained constant over evolutionary time.6 For example, s might represent exposure to sunlight. Exposure to UV light,
in particular, aids in the production of Vitamin D, which is essential for health. The pdf f
incorporates the true e¤ect of sunlight on …tness. The individual, however, can be largely or
completely ignorant of this causal chain, having arbitrary beliefs as captured by the pdf g:
The recurrent nature of this causal chain means, however, that Nature can shape the utility
function in the light of s:
On the other hand, t represents observed aspects of the environment that may be important but have a one-o¤ quality. For instance, a hunter observes the exact position and
strength of his prey, as well as the current abundance of alternative sources of food. By
observing these precise local conditions, in the language of Binmore (1994), the individual
serves as Nature’s “eyes.”The rarity, or even complete novelty, of such an aspect means that
Nature cannot shape utility in the light of t:
If t is transient, how can evolution generate a choice that is optimal given the true
distribution conditional on t as well as s? If t represents completely unrestricted novelty,
there is no hope of attaining optimality. For this to be possible, there must be a suitable
restriction on the novelty. Consider the following example. For simplicity, suppose there
is no s signal, but only t: Further, suppose t is a perfectly accurate signal of the state, ,
which is the exact direction in which game is to be found. If the Individual hunts for game
in that direction, choosing then an action x = t, …tness is 1; otherwise, it is zero. Since
the exact direction is plausibly rare or entirely novel, the utility function under the present
approach cannot be made conditional on t: It seems, nevertheless, highly plausible that an
animal would evolve, via an appropriate reward for …tness, to hunt in the direction of the
signal, t.
This scenario is then consistent with the present approach, in which Nature’s criterion
6

It need not be that s itself is unchanging over time. For example, Nature knows that, if you are warm,
cold drinks would be helpful; if you are cold, hot. Nature makes the appropriate drink seem pleasurable
in each circumstance. Kandel et al. (2000) describe the neurological basis of this phenomenon. This
corresponds to conditionning upon an s that can have a number of possible realizations that vary over time.
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employs the true distribution of the state given each signal, namely, that

= t, and the

optimal action is taken for each value of t.
The model proceeds in three stages:
1. Nature selects a utility function U (x; y; s) for the Individual which can depend on the
as yet undetermined realization of s but not on that of t. The goal of the principal is
to maximize the agent’s true expected …tness, as expressed via the pdf f .
2. The signals s; t are realized.
3. The agent learns his utility function U; observes s; t and selects an action x: The goal of
the agent is to maximize his expected utility conditional on the information available
to him, as expressed in the pdf g:
4. The state

is drawn and the payo¤s of both players – …tness for the principal and

utility for the agent –are realized.
We interpret this setting as a metaphor for the long-run outcome of an evolutionary
process in which the utility functions of humans are heritable and are the object of natural
selection. Over time, through a trial-and-error process, those individuals endowed with
utility functions that best promote their own …tness dominate the population. Rather than
explicitly modelling such trial-and-error process, we suppose Nature can directly “choose”
a …tness-maximizing utility function for each human being. In this metaphor, Nature has
had time to learn the recurrent features of the evolutionary environment (represented by s).
That is, evolution has had time to shape the utility function appropriately.
From the principal’s perspective, the ideal choice of x solves
max Ef [y j s; t] ;
x

(1)

where Ef means that the expectation is taken with respect to the true pdf f: For simplicity,
we assume that, for each pair (s; t), this problem has a unique solution, denoted x (s; t): If
a function U implements x (s; t) for all (s; t); we say it is optimal.
The Individual is fully informed
If the Individual is fully informed, so that g = f; his objective is
max Ef [U (x; y; s) j s; t] :
x

6

(2)

A trivially optimal utility function is then
U (y)

y;

which perfectly aligns the agent’s objective (2) with the principal’s objective (1).
Such resolution, however, is not a realistic description of humans. Most obviously, perhaps, we do not value only o¤spring intrinsically, viewing sex, for example, purely as an
instrumental means to the end of producing more o¤spring. Less obviously, but perhaps
more convincingly, consider how the experimental results of Wedekind et al. (1995) imply
that our utility functions have arguments other than …tness. These results are that males
with compatible immune systems appear to smell good to women. In the language of Barash
(1979), a pleasant smell produces a “whispering within”that motivates them to select such
mates. This amounts to this smell being an argument of utility. We are not born knowing
that compatibility between parental immune systems is relevant to the …tness of o¤spring,
or with any knowledge about how to check such compatibility.
The Individual is not fully informed
When the Individual holds arbitrary beliefs g his problem becomes
max Eg [U (x; y; s) j s; t]
x

=

max
x

Z

U (x; y; s)g( j s; t)d ;

where Eg means that the expectation is taken with respect to the subjective pdf g, and where
y = '(x; ). Note that t a¤ects the Individual’s decision exclusively though the conditional
distribution of ; whereas s serves also as a parameter of the utility function.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to this scenario. We will show that
this mechanism is constrained optimal, for hunter-gatherers, so there would have been no
selection pressure for modi…cation.
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First-Best Implementation –Finite Case

In general, a basic theoretical question is whether there exists a function U that depends
only on x; ; and s and that satis…es the integral equation
Z

'(x; )f ( js; t)d =

Z

7

U (x; ; s)g( js; t)d ;

where the functions '(x; ); f ( js; t) and g( js; t) have been speci…ed exogenously. If y =

'(x; ) were strictly monotonic in ; for each x; then the existence of a function U (x; y; s)
that implements the …tness-maximizing action x (s; t) for all s; t would be a consequence.
However, the existence of a solution for U (x; ; s) to such a “Fredholm equation of the …rst
kind”(Hochstadt (1973)) is a delicate issue.
The choice of a continuous formulation over a discrete one here is mainly a matter of
convenience. Indeed, from a conceptual point of view, a discrete formulation seems unobjectionable. In such a formulation, existence can be readily addressed. Suppose, then, that
and t are restricted to f1; :::; Sg: Given s; the problem is to …nd U (x; ; s) such that
1 S

1 S

S S

S S

X z }| {z }| { X z }| {z }| {
U (x; ; s)g( js; t); for all x:
'(x; )f ( js; t) =
1 S

z }| {
This equation has a unique solution for the row vector U (x; ; s) if and only if the matrix
S S
z }| {
g( js; t) is non-singular, which is a condition that holds generically.7
More generally,

and t might be restricted to …nite sets of di¤erent sizes, f1; :::; Sg and

f1; :::; T g. Perhaps the plausible alternative case is where the number of signals is less than
1 S
z }| {
the number of states, and so S > T . That is, there are more unknowns, as in U (x; ; s); than
S T
z }| {
there are equations, where there is one for each signal, t: If the matrix g( js; t) has full rank,
T , then there is again no problem of existence; rather there is an issue of multiplicity— there
1 S
z }| {
are many solutions for U (x; ; s):
We have then proved a simple but illuminating result—
S T

Proposition 1 Suppose S
1 S
z }| {
for the row vector U (x; ; s).

z }| {
T: If matrix g( js; t) has full rank, T , there exists a solution

The approach we take below renders this discussion moot. We maintain the continuous
S S

z }| {
7
Generically in RS ; the matrix g( jt) has a nonzero determinant. Now normalize each column by
2

S S

z }| {
dividing by the sum of the entries in that column to obtain g( jt): This normalization does not a¤ect the
determinant.

8

formulation, but we sidestep the most general issue of existence by imposing substantive
additional structure. This structure is mainly intended to generate a tractable model, and
to make available further results, but, as a side e¤ect, it ensures existence.

4

A Monotone Environment

We revert to seeking an optimal utility function of the form U (x; y; s): We …rst relax the
R
requirement of matching the entire function '(x; )f ( js; t)d , asking only that expected
utility be maximized by x (s; t): That is, we require only that, given s;
x (s; t) = arg max
x

Z

'(x; )f ( js; t)d = arg max
x

Z

U (x; y; s)g( js; t)d ; for all t

This relaxation of the restrictions on utility is helpful. It is reasonable as well, since there
would have been be no biological selection that did more than this.
Assumption 1 i) The pdf f ( js; t) is continuously di¤erentiable in (s; t) and strictly increasing, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, in s and in t:8

ii) The pdf g( js; t) is continuously di¤erentiable in (s; t) and strictly increasing, in the

sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, in s and in t:

iii) Fitness '(x; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave in x:9
iv) Increasing the state

increases the marginal product of each action: 'xi (x; ) > 0;

for i = 1; :::; N:
v) Actions are complements in that 'xi xj (x; )

0; for all i; j = 1; :::; N; i 6= j:
@x (s;t)

@x (s;t)

Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, xi (s; t) is di¤erentiable and i@s > 0; i@t > 0, for
R
all i: Furthermore, if x^(s; t) = arg maxx '(x; )g( js; t)d , it similarly follows that x^i (s; t)
is di¤erentiable and

@x
^i (s;t)
@s

> 0;

@x
^i (s;t)
@t

> 0, for all i:

Proof. See the Appendix.
The Main Result in the Monotone Environment
In order to set the stage for this result, consider an arbitrary x 2 RN : We associate to

the component xi the value of t 2 R such that the ith component of x (s; t) is xi :

R
Speci…cally, we require that v( ) @f (@sjs;t) d > 0 for all continuous and strictly increasing functions v;
similarly for t:
9
Speci…cally, we require that the matrix of second derivatives of '( ; ) is everywhere negative de…nite.
8

9

De…nition 1 Let ti : R

R ! R be such that xi (s; ti (xi ; s))

xi , for all i:

We now demonstrate the existence of a simple utility function which is uniquely maximized at the optimal x:
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, for all s; t the following utility function implements x (s; t)—
U (x; y; s) = y + (x; s) = '(x; ) + (x; s):
The “adjustment term” is
(x; s) =

X

i

(xi ; s)

i

where
i

(xi ; s) =

Z

xi

0

Z

'xi (x (s; ti (z; s)); )g( js; ti (z; s))d dz:10

Proof. See Appendix.
This is the simplest utility function that delivers x (s; t); in that

(x; s) is determinis-

tic (independent of ), additively separable from y and across the components of x: Note
also that such an additive term must depend on both x and s and thus cannot be further
simpli…ed.
Proof in One Dimension
When x is one-dimensional, so N = 1; the …rst-order condition becomes
Z

'x (x; )g( js; t)d

Z

'x (x (s; t(x; s)); )g( js; t(x; s))d = 0:

Since t(x; s) is the value of t that induces x as the solution to the constrained optimum,
it follows that x (s; t(x; s)) = x. Hence if x = x (s; t) then t(x; s) = t and this …rst-order
condition is satis…ed. Further, if x < x (s; t), then t(x; s) < t: Since g( js; t) is increasing in
R
t in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, it follows that 'x (x; )g( js; t(x; s))d >
R
'x (x; )g( js; t)d ; so that marginal expected utility is then positive. Similarly, if x >
x (s; t), then marginal expected utility is negative. Hence x = x (s; t) is the global maximizer
of expected utility.
Sketch of Proof in Two Dimensions
The case in which x is two-dimensional serves to demonstrate the intuitive idea of the
general proof, although the general case is substantially more complex technically. With
10

The lower limit in the outer integral is taken to be 0 to ensure convergence.
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N = 2; the …rst-order conditions for maximizing expected utility are
Z

'xi (x; )g( js; t)d =

Z

'xi (x (s; ti (xi ; s)); )g( js; ti (xi ; s))d for i = 1; 2:

As required, these …rst-order conditions are satis…ed by x = x (s; t) since this implies
ti (xi ; s) = t; for i = 1; 2:
Indeed, it follows that x = x (s; t) is the unique global maximum. To see why, consider
any x 6= x (s; t): Figure 1 describes the directions in which expected utility unambiguously

increases. These directions can be established by signing the corresponding derivatives.

These directions lie in the NE quadrant and the SW quadrant relative to x (s; t): There are
two representative cases to consider. Case i) x

x (s; t): In this case, Figure 2 sketches how

it is possible to move from x to x (s; t) in a fashion that increases expected utility. That
is, …rst reduce the coordinate that is too large relative to being on the x (s; ) curve. Then
move along this curve x (s; ) to x (s; t): (The case in the SW quadrant where x
is analogous.) Case ii) x1

x (s; t)

x1 (s; t) and x2 < x2 (s; t): Refer to Figure 3. Consider a path

from x to x (s; t) that …rst increases x2 to x2 (s; t); as in Step 1 in Figure 3, and then reduces
x1 to x1 (s; t); as in Step 2. Step 2 is a limiting case from Figure 1 where expected utility
must increase, but Step 1 is apparently ambiguous. Consider, however, Step 1’, where x2
increases to x2 (s; t); with x1 = x1 (s; t): Expected utility must increase in Step 1’ since it
is again a limiting case from Figure 1. The assumption that 'x1 x2 (x; )

0 implies that

expected utility must increase by at least as much in Step 1 as it does in Step 1’, so it must
increase in the two-step process— …rst Step 1 and then Step 2. The case in which x lies in
the NW quadrant is analogous, so the sketch of the proof is complete.
Observations
Note that this particular decomposition of utility generates a particular trade-o¤ between
y and x; so the individual would sacri…ce expected o¤spring for, say, more food. Furthermore,
this decomposition into y and x is unique, within the additively separable class, even though
y is itself a function of x as y = '(x; ); under the additional assumption that utility cannot
depend directly on :
Remark 1 A measure of the contribution of Nature to the Individual’s decision is
Z

2

'xi (x (s; t); )g( js; t)d

11

:

This measure is expressed purely in terms of the …tness function and so is independent
of the utility representation. It is a measure of how much the optimal choice of x (s; t)
involves “adjusting”the Individual’s preferences away from expected …tness, generating then
derivatives of expected o¤spring that di¤er from zero.
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Examples

Consider …rst the case of N = 1 and the simple quadratic …tness function '(x; ) =
Suppose further that the state has a di¤use prior, so that
For Nature, s =

+ "s where "s

N (0; vs ); and t =

"0t

)2 :

N ( 0 ; 1) loosely speaking.

+ "t ; where "t

+ "0s where "0s

"t are independent. For the Individual, s =

(x

N (0; vt ) and "s and

N (0; vs0 ); and t =

+ "0t where

N (0; vt0 ) and "0s and "0t are independent.
The true mean of

after observing both s and t is11
= s + (1

so that

)t where

=

1
vs
1
vs

1
vt

+

2 (0; 1);

is the precision of Nature’s information relative to that of the Individual. With a

quadratic …tness, the optimal x is, in general, the mean of the distribution of . Hence, it
follows that x (s; t) = s + (1
The mean of

)t.

from the Individual’s point of view is
0

= s + (1

Using the general formula
)t(z; s) = z; so t(z; s) =

z
1

s

)t where

(x; s) =
, we have

RxR

U (x; y; s) = y

=

1
vs0
1
vs0

1
vt0

+

2 (0; 1):

'x (z; )g( js; t(z; s))d dz where s + (1

1

(x

s)2 :

Thus the (positive or negative) weight put on the term

(x

s)2 ; which re‡ects how the

individual’s choices are adjusted away from those that maximize expected …tness, depends
on

and :

11
Assuming that the variance of the prior distribution of
is irrelevant.

12

is in…nite implies that the mean of this prior

If 1 >

> ; then the individual is induced to make a choice that puts a greater weight

on s than does

0

. If, in the limit, 1 =

> ; then x = s; since the transient signal t is then

irrelevant.
If

>

> 0; then the individual is induced to make a choice that puts a lower weight

on s than does

0

. If, in the limit,

>

= 0; then x = t; since the recurrent signal s is then

irrelevant.
In this example, the adjustment of the Individual’s utility is measured by
Eg 'xi (x (s; t); )js; t

2

= (Eg [ js; t]

)2 (t

= (
Hence

When

6=

h
i
2
E Eg 'xi (x (s; t); )js; t
=(

Ef [ js; t])2
s)2

)2 (vs + vt ) :

; the Individual sacri…ces …tness, as judged using his beliefs, in order to

obtain higher intrinsic utility from x:
The magnitude of this e¤ect increases in j

An Anecdote

j.

To illustrate the implications of the relative precision of the information held by Nature
and that held the Individual, consider the situation faced by an individual hiking across
Ba¢ n Island.12 There are two main dangers faced on such a trek— polar bears and rivers.
Of these, bears are more psychologically salient. A hiker inevitably worries more about
encountering a bear than encountering a river. However, although rivers are less dangerous
per encounter, there are many more encounters with them and the aggregate danger posed
by rivers exceeds that posed by polar bears. One needs to take river crossings seriously.
In terms of the current model, it seems reasonable, on the one hand, that the information
held by Nature concerning bears is rather precise relative to any information available to the
Individual. Indeed, polar bears belong to the category of large carnivores with sharp yellow
fangs and claws that one is instinctively afraid of. There are not many su¢ ciently good
reasons to voluntarily approach a polar bear. That is, in terms of the example, it may well
be that 1

> ; so that the transient signal is essentially irrelevant. On the other hand,

rivers can be useful. Thus the information held by the agent may well be decisive. There are
12

A more familiar example concerns rats’behavior in the face of either snakes or ‡owers, as in the literature
on prepared learning. See the next section.

13

indeed many su¢ ciently good reasons to cross a river, and the overall evolutionary strategy
is to rely to a much larger extent on the agent’s assessment of the local circumstances. Thus,
>

0; and so x is heavily dependent on t:

An Example of Labor-Leisure Choice
Assume that …tness y = '(x; ) = x

c(x); where x is e¤ort, x is a material output

and c(x) is the cost of e¤ort.
Suppose Ef [ js; t] =

s + (1

previous example.

)t and Eg [ js; t] = s + (1

)t as obtained in the

An optimal utility function is now
U (x; y; s) = y

1

[c(x)

sx] :

To interpret this function, suppose s represents the state of the immune system, and
>

. After illness, the immune system is depleted, so we assume s < t. The model

predicts less e¤ort in this circumstance.
Indeed, it is believed that, after illness, cytokines are released that inhibit e¤ort, and the
individual exhibits “anhedonia.” Evidence for the inhibitory role of cytokines comes from
experiments that involve injecting cytokines into healthy rats. This makes them expend less
e¤ort for a given reward. (See Trivers, 2011.)
In this case, the Individual perceives a cost of e¤ort that varies as

varies with the

task, even though the actual …tness cost of e¤ort is invariant. It seems psychologically
plausible, for example, that the perceived e¤ort involved in walking 10km is less when there
is a magni…cent view than when walking to work.

6

Application to Conformity and Prepared Learning

Consider now how the present approach yields a framework for considering the evolution
of interdependent preferences.13 Consider two individuals who choose sequentially, with
Individual 1 choosing in the light of the recurrent signal, s; and her transient signal, t1 ;
and Individual 2 choosing in the light of the recurrent signal, his transient signal, t2 and
13

Samuelson (2004) is a key antecedent in the literature on relative consumption. He also supposes that
the observable but inherently irrelevant consumption of others conveys information about an unobservable
but relevant state. In contrast to the model here, Samuelson adopts an informational structure in which
there is no counterpart to the information of Nature and therefore no counterpart to the application to
prepared learning outlined below.
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Individual 1’s choice, x1 . The transient signals are independent, so observing x1 is useful
to Individual 2. Given the appropriate utility function, Individual 1 e¤ectively maximizes
R
'(x1 ; )f ( js; t1 )d by choosing x1 (s; t1 ): This appropriate utility is
U1 (x1 ; y1 ; s) = y1 + (x1 ; s) = '(x1 ; ) + (x1 ; s)
Z x1 Z
'x (z; )g1 ( js; t1 (z; s))d dz; for all t; given s;
where (x1 ; s) =
0

exactly as in Theorem 1, where the pdf g1 ( js; t1 ) represents Individual 1’s beliefs. Following
from Assumption 1, a key property is that

@x1 (s;t1 )
@t1

> 0; so Individual 2 can infer t1 from any

possible observed value of x1 : We can then formulate Individual 2’s beliefs and choices in
terms of x1 :
Consider now Individual 2’s ideal choice, x2 (s; x1 ; t2 ); given s; x1 ; and t2 : This is the
R
choice that maximizes '(x2 ; )h( js; x1 ; t2 )d : In this expression, h represents the true
pdf for

conditional on s; x1 ; and t2 : Assume that increases in any of s; x1 or t2 increase

the distribution for

in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. The problem facing

Individual 2 remains analogous to that described in detail in Section 4, with s and x1 together
playing the role that was played by s alone and t2 playing the role of t:
Extending Theorem 1 to this context, it follows that there exists a utility function whose
expectation under Individual 2’s beliefs, given by the pdf g2 ( js; x1 ; t2 ); is uniquely maximized by x2 (s; x1 ; t2 ) of the form

U2 (x2 ; y2 ; s; x1 ) = y2 + (x2 ; s; x1 ):
The following captures a “conformity”or “anticonformity”e¤ect—
De…nition 2 De…ne the (marginal) peer e¤ect as
@ 2 (x2 ;s;x1 )
@x2 @x1

@ (x2 ;s;x1 )
:
@x2 @x1

If this peer e¤ect is positive—

> 0; an increase in the action taken by Individual 1 spurs an increase in the

marginal utility of the action taken by Individual 2, and there is a conformity e¤ect . If this
peer e¤ect is negative—

@ 2 (x2 ;s;x1 )
@x2 @x1

< 0; there is an anticonformity e¤ect .

An Example on Prepared Learning
Suppose …tness for each individual is quadratic, of the form '(x; ) =
that

N ( 0 ; 1); s

N ( ; vs ); and ti

N ( ; vt ); i = 1; 2; where s; t1 and t2 are

independent. The optimal choice for 1 is then x1 =
where r =

1 1
=
vs vt

)2 : Suppose

(x

1s

+ (1

1 )t1 ;

for

1

=

r
1+r

2 (0; 1);

is the true precision of the recurrent signal relative to that of the transient
15

signal. Given beliefs by the Individual 1, this choice can be implemented by a suitable
utility function, as described above, but the precise form of this function is not relevant to
the present focus, which is on Individual 2.
Consider then Individual 2. The optimal choice for 2 in the light of s; t1 and t2 is
x2 =

2 s + (1

2)

t1 +t2
;
2

where

2

=

r
2+r

2 (0; 1): There is an interesting implication of these

optimal choices that is independent of Individual 2’s beliefs. Note that x2 can be expressed
as

1+r
r
x1 +
t2 ;
2+r
2+r

x2 =

where there is no explicit dependence of x2 on s: An increase in x1 spurs a positive but
less-than-matching increase in x2 : The weight put on x1 in this expression for x2 is uniquely
determined by the optimal weight that needs to be put on t1 : The absence of s in the above
expression follows since the relative weight that x2 puts on s and t1 is the same as the relative
weight that x1 puts on these two signals.
Consider some relevant results from the psychology literature on prepared learning. Monkeys do not exhibit an inborn fear of snakes or of ‡owers (less surprisingly). However, they
readily learn to be afraid of snakes if they observe another monkey acting fearfully in the
presence of a snake. It is much more di¢ cult to teach them similarly to be afraid of ‡owers
(Cook and Mineka, 1989, for example).
The example sheds light on these phenomena. Suppose that r; the precision of the
recurrent signal relative to the transient signal, increases. It follows that Individual 2 is
more responsive to Individual 1’s choice.14 That is, individuals are more in‡uenced by peer
choices concerning snakes, where the recurrent signal seems to be relatively precise, than
they are by those concerning ‡owers, where it is less so.
Consider now the peer e¤ect. This brings in the beliefs of Individual 2. Suppose that
N ( 00 ; 1); s

these beliefs are described by

so that E ( jg2 ( js; x1 ; t2 ) = s + x1 + (1

N ( ; vs0 ); x1

N ( ; vx0 ) and t2

)t2 ; for some ;

> 0 where

N ( ; vt0 );
+

< 1:15

It follows that the choice of x2 is implemented by the utility function
U 2 = y2

k(x2

s

)x1 )2 ; where k = (1 + r)

(1

The peer e¤ect in this example is 2k(1
14

Namely,

1+r
2+r

15

Indeed,

=

1
0
vs
+ v10
x

+ v10
t

; and

=

1
0
vs

1
0
vx
+ v10
x

+ v10

=

k

:

) = 2k + 2 , which can be either positive or

is increasing in r:
1
0
vs

(2 + r)( + ) and

:

t
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negative. In either case, since

dk
dr

> 0; the peer e¤ect is greater, the larger is

=1

the precision of Nature’s signal for the recurrent signal relative to the transient one. That
is, the peer e¤ect is larger if it is positive to start with, or less negative if it is negative to
start with.
This result implies that the observations concerning prepared learning, as derived above
for optimal choices, would apply in a modern environment despite the application of di¤erent
beliefs that do not yield evolutionarily optimal choice. The topic of how the adjustment term
in utility would manifest itself in modern choices that fail to be evolutionarily optimal is taken
up next.

7

Application to Decisions in the Modern Environment

There are vast di¤erences between the ancestral environment in which our basic preferences
evolved and the present environment. A central, though informal, claim in the literature on
evolutionary psychology is that such di¤erences have led to “misalignments” in our preferences in the sense that we frequently make …tness-reducing choices. Notably, the preference
misalignments studied thus far belong to a single category: those originating in technological
advances that have increased both the general availability of resources and our control over
reproduction. Common examples cited in the literature include the tendency of modern
humans to consume excessive amounts of sugar and fat and their tendency to use contraceptives. In terms of our model, such misalignments would readily arise upon altering the
Individual’s …tness function while holding his beliefs and utility function constant.
In this section, we investigate a di¤erent category of preference misalignments: those
originating from our improved understanding, relative to our hunter-gather ancestors, of the
link between actions and …tness. In our model, as we illustrate below, such misalignments
arise when changing the Individual’s beliefs while holding her …tness and utility functions
constant. Such misalignments generate a set of testable, revealed preference, predictions of
the model.
For concreteness, we consider the problem of a perfectly-knowledgeable Individual who
understands that the state

is distributed according to f; not g; and is nevertheless endowed

with an “ancestral”utility function. In this exercise, for simplicity, we assume that the …tness
function ' is the same for the ancestral and modern environments.
17

Speci…cally, consider a monotone environment with N = 1; a quadratic …tness function
'(x; ) =

)2 ; and g 6= f: Moreover, suppose the Individual is endowed with the utility

(x

function in Theorem 1:

U (x; y; s) = y + (x; s);
where (x; s) =

RxR
0

)g( js; t(z; s))d dz for all x; s:

2(z

Lemma 2 Consider a perfectly-knowledgeable Individual who solves, for all s; t;
max Ef ['(x; ) j s; t] + (x; s):
x

The Individual’s optimal choice, denoted xM (s; t), satis…es:
1. Given s; t; xM (s; t) is greater (smaller) than x (s; t) whenever Ef [ j s; t] is greater
(smaller) than Eg [ j s; t] :

2. Suppose further that Ef [ j s; t] = s + (1
some ;

2 (0; 1) : Given s; t;

@ M
x (s; t)
@s

)t and Eg [ j s; t] = s + (1

is greater (smaller) than

@
x
@s

)t for

(s; t) whenever

is greater (smaller) than :

Proof. Fix s; t: The Individual’s objective is strictly concave and the corresponding …rstorder condition is
Ef [ j s; t]

Eg [ j s; t(x; s)] = 0:

Part 1 of the lemma follows from noting that Eg [ j s; t(x; s)] is increasing in x and Eg [ j s; t(x; s)] =
Eg [ j s; t] when x = x (s; t).

For part 2 of the lemma, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem to the Individual’s

…rst-order condition to obtain
@ M
x (s; t) =
@s
=

@
t(x; s)
@s
@
t(x; s)
@x

+

@
x (s; t) + (
@s

@
@
E [ j s; t] @s
Eg [ j s; t(x; s)]
@s f
@
@
E [ j s; t(x; s)] @x
t(x; s)
@t g

)

1
1

;

which establishes the desired result.
Part 1 of the lemma indicates that when the Individual’s ancestors underestimated (overestimated) the marginal …tness value of a given action, this Individual will select, once perfectly informed, an excessively large (small) action relative to its …tness-maximizing level.
18

An example is a modern human who sunbathes excessively upon learning that sunlight aids
his production of Vitamin D. The Individual faces a double incentive: a primitive intrinsic
preference for sunlight and a recently-acquired knowledge of its …tness bene…ts.
Part 2 of the lemma indicates that when the Individual’s ancestor had beliefs Eg [ j s; t]

that under-reacted (over-reacted) to increases in s; this individual, once perfectly informed,
will over-react (under-react) to increases in s. Consider the following example in which s is
the observed action of a peer. Suppose a modern human develops an excessive aversion (a
phobia) toward a spider upon learning that a peer fears that spider. We can understand this
aversion in the light of our approach as arising from two independent reasons. First, there is
an evolved utility adjustment that is triggered by his peer’s fear— that is, prepared learning
as in the previous section. Second, there is an e¤ect on his beliefs of his peer’s fear, since
this fear signals that the spider is likely to be poisonous— as considered in this section.

8

Conclusions

The motivating question that we began with was: Supposing, for the sake of argument, that
we are intelligent and rational, why is our evolved utility not simply o¤spring? We formulated
a principal-agent model in which both Nature and the individual observed two signals— one
recurrent and one transient— that bear on the …tness consequences of the agent’s choices.
The agent, however, has arbitrary beliefs about the implications of the signals. One abstract
option would be for Nature to explicitly and directly communicate her accurate beliefs to
the agent, who could then choose optimally by maximizing expected …tness in the light of
these beliefs. This option, however, is simply not realistic.
Alternatively, we consider the more realistic option that Nature shapes the utility function
in the light of the recurrent signal. The individual then maximizes the expectation of this
utility conditional her rather arbitrary beliefs. We show, remarkably enough, that this option
could also generate optimal choice in the context of the model. That this is the method
actually in evidence, despite the existence of a more direct way of achieving the same end,
may then have been harmless phylogenetic happenstance.
We considered why utility is a “whispering within” urging individuals to take actions
that re‡ect the evolutionary wisdom of a multitude of ancestors, in addition to accounting
for local on-the-spot information. In our examples, the loudness of the whisper, or the force
of push delivered by Nature, derives from the relative precision of the signals for Nature as

19

compared to the relative precision of the two signals from the point of view of the individual.
In vastly changed modern conditions— not the least of which involves contraception— the
mechanism may no longer be evolutionarily optimal. Nevertheless, the legacy of this mechanism is plausible— namely utility functions that convey evolutionary information, rather
than explicit transmission of the raw statistical information.
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Appendix— Proofs

9.1

Proof of Lemma 1.

The function x (s; t) is characterized by the …rst-order conditions
Z

'xi (x (s; t); )f ( js; t)d = 0; for i = 1; :::; N:

Hence

X
j

Aij

@xj (s; t)
= bi for i = 1; :::; N;
@t

where
Aij =
The n

Z

'xi xj (x (s; t); )f ( js; t)d and bi =

Z

'xi (x (s; t); )

@f ( js; t)
d < 0.
@t

n matrix A is symmetric, negative de…nite, and has non-negative o¤-diagonal el-

ements. Hence

A is a Stieltjes matrix, which must have a symmetric and non-negative

inverse (see Varga (1962, p. 85)). Hence A
Since

it follows that

2

@xj (s;t)
@t

6
6
4

1

must be a symmetric and non-positive matrix.
3

@x1 (s;t)
@t

:::
@xN (s;t)
@t

7
7 = A 1 b;
5

0, for j = 1; :::; N: Further, since A

any row be entirely zero, and it must indeed be that
The proof that

@xj (s;t)
@s

@xj (s;t)
@t

1

is non-singular, it cannot have

> 0, for j = 1; :::; N:

> 0; for j = 1; :::; N is analogous, as are the corresponding

properties of x^(s; t):
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9.2

Proof of Theorem 1

Select an arbitrary s: To simplify notation, we drop the dependence of x ( ) and ( ) on s:
De…ne, for all x and t,
V (x; t) = E ['(x; ) j t] + (x);
where the expectation is taken over

using the pdf g:

We wish to show that V (x (t); t) > V (x; t) for all t and all x 6= x (t):
Remark 2 Properties of V (x; t). For all i and all t:
1.
2.
3.

@
V
@xi
@
V
@xi
@
V
@xi

(xi ; x i ; t) is weakly increasing in x

i

for all xi :

(x; t) is strictly increasing in t for all x:
(x (t); t) = 0.

Proof. From the de…nitions of V ( ) and ( ) we obtain
@
V (x; t) = E 'xi (xi ; x i ; ) j t
@xi

E 'xi (x (ti (xi )); ) j ti (xi ) :

(3)

For property 1, note that the …rst term on the R.H.S. of (3) is weakly increasing in x
(since, by assumption,

@2
'(x;
@xi @xj

)

0 for all x;

independent of x i :

i

and all i 6= j), and the second term is

For property 2, note that the …rst term on the R.H.S. of (3) is increasing in t (since,
by assumption,

@2
@xi @

'(x; ) > 0 for all x;

and all i; and the pdf g is increasing in t in

…rst-order stochastic dominance), and the second term is independent of t:
For property 3, note that ti (xi (t)) = t (by de…nition) and therefore
E 'xi (x (t); ) j t = E 'xi (x (ti (xi )); ) j ti (xi ) :

Now select an arbitrary t and an arbitrary x 6= x (t): Let

WLOG, that

minf 1 ; tg and

1

2
N +1

:::

maxf

N:

Also, select two numbers

N ; tg:

De…ne
M+ = fi : xi
M

xi (t)g ;

= fi : xi < xi (t)g :
21

i

= ti (xi ) for all i: Assume,

0

and

N +1

such that

0

Note that
V (x _ x (t); t) =

X Z

V (x; t) +

n+1 ;tg

minf

n

n2M

d
V (xi
d

n(

); xi>n ; t)d ;

and

V (x (t); t) +

X Z

n2M+

V (x _ x (t); t) =

n

maxf

n 1 ;tg

d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
d

n(

); t)d ;

where M+n is de…ned as the set fi 2 M+ : i < ng :
It follows that

V (x (t); t)

V (x; t) =
n

maxf

n 1 ;tg

minf

n+1 ;tg

d
V (xi
d

n(

); xi>n ; t)d

d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
d

n(

); t)d :

n2M

X Z

n2M+

X Z

We begin by showing that V (x (t); t)

n

(4)

V (x; t); for which we proceed in two steps.

Step 1. We show that all terms in the …rst sum of (4) are nonnegative. Fix n 2 M :

For all

2(

n ; min f n+1 ; tg)

(a possibly empty interval) we have
d
V (xi
d

X @
V (xi
@xj
j n

X @
V (xi
@xj
j n

X @
V (xi
@x
j
j n
(Recall that

d
d

n(

n(

n(

n(

); xi>n ; t)

); xi>n (min f

); xi>n (min f

(5)

); xi>n ; t) =
d
x( )
d j

n+1 ; tg); t)

d
x( )
d j

n+1 ; tg); min f n+1 ; tg)

d
x ( ) > 0:
d j

xj ( ) > 0 for all j.)

The …rst weak inequality in (5) follows from property 1 of the remark: xi
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xi (min f

n+1 ; tg)

for all i > n implies
@
V (xi
@xj
@
V (xi
@xj

n(

n(

); xi>n ; t)

); xi>n (min f

n+1 ; tg); t)

for all j

n:

The second weak inequality in (5) follows from property 2 of the remark: t
implies
@
V (xi
@xj
@
V (xi
@xj

n(

n(

); xi>n (min f

); xi>n (min f

min f

n+1 ; tg

n+1 ; tg); t)

n+1 ; tg); min f n+1 ; tg)

for all j

n:

Finally, the strict inequality in (5) follows from combining all three properties of the
remark:

< min f

n+1 ; tg

implies xi ( ) < xi (min f

@
V (xi
@xj

n(

@
V (x ( ); min f
@xj

); xi>n (min f
n+1 ; tg)

>

n+1 ; tg)

for all i and therefore

n+1 ; tg); min f n+1 ; tg)

@
V (x ( ); ) = 0 for all j
@xj

n:

Step 2. We show that all terms in the second sum of (4) are nonpositive. Fix n 2 M+ :

Note that for all

2 (max f

n 1 ; tg ;

n)

(a possibly empty interval) we have

d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
d

n(

(6)

); t) =

X @
d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi n ( ); t)
x( )
@xj
d j
j n
X @
d
V (xi<n (max f n 1 ; tg); xi n ( ); t)
x( )
@xj
d j
j n

X @
V (xi<n (max f
@x
j
j n

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

); max f

n 1 ; tg)

d
x ( ) < 0:
d j

The …rst weak inequality in (6) follows from property 1 of the remark: xi2M (t); xi2M+n

23

xi<n (max f

n 1 ; tg)

implies
@
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
@xj

@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

n(

); t)

); t) for all j

n:

The second weak inequality in (6) follows from property 2 of the remark: t

max f

implies
@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj
@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

); max f

n 1 ; tg

); t)

n 1 ; tg)

for all j

n:

Finally, the strict inequality in (6) follows from combining all three properties of the
remark:

> max f

n 1 ; tg

implies xi ( ) > xi (max f

@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj
@
V (x ( ); max f
@xj

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

n 1 ; tg)

<

n 1 ; tg)

); max f

for all i and therefore
n 1 ; tg)

@
V (x ( ); ) = 0 for all j
@xj

n:

We now show that V (x (t); t) > V (x; t): Since x 6= x (t) there exists either an n 2 M

such that the interval (
(max f

n 1 ; tg ;

n)

n ; min f n+1 ; tg)

is nonempty, or an n 2 M+ such that the interval

is nonempty (or both). In the former case, it follows from step 1 above

that at least one of the integrals in the …rst sum of (4) is positive. In the latter case, it follows
from step 2 above that at least one of the integrals in the second sum of (4) is negative.
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